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Abstract
In this Essay, Professor Dinah Shelton draws on her personal experience
as a member of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to dis-
cuss the underlying causes of a “crisis of commitment” to the Inter-American
system of human rights. Shelton traces the roots of this crisis in large part
to the Inter-American petition procedures. Giving an in-depth account of
the structure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the
details of the petition procedures, Shelton explores the issues of legitimacy,
transparency, effectiveness, and efficiency raised by various aspects of the
petitioning process, and discusses the various ways in which these issues in
the petition process contribute to the broader crisis of the system’s author-
ity. She ultimately concludes with a series of proposed reforms—ranging
from radical to relatively simple—for improving the structure and proce-
dures of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, with a view
toward restoring the credibility of human rights protections in the Ameri-
cas.
† Manatt/Ahn Professor of International Law (emeritus), The George Washington University
Law School; member (2010–2014) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
I would like to thank Paolo Carozza and Doug Cassel for their collaboration over the years, for
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I Introduction
Like other global and regional systems for the promotion and protection of hu-
man rights, the Inter-American system has evolved in norms, institutions, and
procedures during its six decades of operations, presenting new opportunities
and new challenges at each stage of its development. Initially, the states that
participated in creating the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948 re-
ferred briefly to human rights in the OAS Charter,1 simultaneously adopting
the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (ADRDM),2 some
months before the United Nations completed the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights.3 The 1948 ADRDM gave definition to the Charter’s general com-
mitment to human rights,4 but more than a decade elapsed before the OAS cre-
ated the seven member Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR),
with a mandate of furthering the observance of human rights among member
states.
In 1965, the member states expanded the Commission’s competence, allow-
ing it to accept communications, request information from governments, and
make recommendations to bring about more effective observance of human
rights. The American Convention of Human Rights, signed in 1969, conferred
jurisdiction on the IACHR to oversee compliance with the Convention along
with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the Court), created when the
Convention entered into force in 1978.5 The Court may hear contentious cases
involving states that accept its jurisdiction,6 and may issue advisory opinions at
the request of the IACHR as well as any OASmember state.7 The Inter-American
system has further expanded its human rights guarantees and the jurisdiction of
the IACHR through the adoption of additional human rights instruments.
Today, the American Convention and its protocols, other OAS human rights
treaties, the Statute of the IACHR,8 and the Rules of Procedure,9 give the IACHR
1 Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2416, 119 U.N.T.S.
48. The Charter has been amended by several protocols.
2 Ninth International Conference of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man (June 2, 1949), reprinted in Secretariat of the Inter-Am. Court of Human
Rights, Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System 19
(Feb. 2012 ed. 2012) [hereinafter Basic Documents].
3 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
4 See Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man within the
Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-
10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 10 (July 14, 1989).
5 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 (entered into force
July 18, 1978).
6 Id. arts. 61, 62.
7 Id. art. 64.
8 O.A.S. G.A. Res. 447 (IX), Statute of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights
(Oct. 31, 1979) [hereinafter IACHR Statute], reprinted in Basic Documents, supra note 2, at 133.
9 Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 1/2013, Reform of the Rules of Proce-
dure, Policies and Practices, at 4–17 (Mar. 18, 2013), reprinted in Inter-Am. Commission
on Human Rights, Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/RulesIACHR2013.pdf (last visited June 25,
2015) [hereinafter IACHR Rules].
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numerous functions to promote and protect human rights. Among these man-
dates, the Commission has broad subject matter and personal jurisdiction to
receive petitions from “any person or group of persons or nongovernmental en-
tity legally recognized in one or more OAS member states.”10 The petitions may
be filed against any OAS member state complaining of violations of a right guar-
anteed by the ADRDM, the Convention and its protocols,11 or the conventions
against torture,12 forced disappearance,13 and violence against women.14 Indi-
viduals or groups, in addition to submitting a petition, or as a separate filing
without a petition, may ask the IACHR to issue a request to a state for pre-
cautionary measures to prevent imminent and irreparable harm,15 or to request
provisional measures from the Court in situations of extreme gravity and ur-
gency.16
Exercise of the functions and powers given to the IACHR and the Court
has not been without controversy, even backlash. At the same time, the number
of demands on these bodies to exercise their functions has grown. Many coun-
tries of the region have experienced or are undergoing transition from repressive
regimes toward democratic governance.17 Such transitions, coupled with a rise
in the number and membership of civil society organizations, and greater aware-
ness of internationally-guaranteed human rights,18 have resulted in growing ex-
pectations from victims and their representatives that the Inter-American sys-
tem can address all individual and systemic violations of human rights. The list
of claims includes police violence, disappearances, violence against women and
10 Id. art. 23.
11 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69 (entered into force Aug. 28, 1991),
reprinted in Basic Documents, supra note 2, at 77; Protocol to the American Convention onHuman
Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, June 8, 1990, O.A.S.T.S. No. 73, reprinted in Basic Docu-
ments, supra note 2, at 91.
12 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. No. 67
(entered into force Feb. 28, 1987), reprinted in Basic Documents, supra note 2, at 95.
13 Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, June 9, 1994, O.A.S.T.S.
No. 68 (entered into force Mar. 28 1996), reprinted in Basic Documents, supra note 2, at 105.
14 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against
Women, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1995), reprinted in Basic Docu-
ments, supra note 2, at 115.
15 IACHR Rules, supra note 9, art. 25.
16 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, art. 63(2).
17 See, e.g., Cecilia Medina Quiroga, The Battle of Human Rights: Gross, Systematic
Violations and the Inter-American System (1988); see also David Weissbrodt & Maria Luisa
Bartolomei, Essay, The Effectiveness of International Human Rights Pressures: The Case of Ar-
gentina, 1976–1983, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1009 (1991).
18 See Rep. of the Special Working Group to Reflect on the Workings of the Inter-Am. Comm’n
on Hum. Rts. with a View to Strengthening the Inter-Am. Sys. for Consideration by the Permanent
Council, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.G./GT/SIDH-13/11 rev. 2 (Dec. 13, 2011) (attributing the increased
number of petitions and cases to the consolidation of democracy and increased participation in
and awareness of the system); Annual Rep. of the Inter-Am. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., ch. 2, O.A.S.
Doc. OEA/Ser.L./V/II, doc. 50 corr. 1 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 Annual Report]. In 2013, seventy
percent of the 2061 petitions filed came from five states with numerous and active civil society
organizations: Mexico (660), Columbia (328), Peru (201), Argentina (191), and the United States
(109).
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sexual minorities, restitution and demarcation of indigenous ancestral lands, dis-
crimination, lack of due process and independence in judicial bodies, attacks on
human rights defenders and the media, and other widespread intractable prob-
lems in the hemisphere. The result is a steady growth in the number of petitions
brought to the IACHR,19 creating an ever-increasing backlog of petitions to be
processed,20 long delays, and repeated efforts, if not always successful, to reform
case management.
The backlash to continued monitoring of human rights has come in part
because the OAS member states are divided by politics, culture, ideology, eco-
nomic strength, and unwillingness to accept scrutiny of their human rights per-
formance. Some states assert that they should be less subject to monitoring be-
cause they have been through the transition from military rule or other forms of
repression and have moved towards a more open society. Other states allege po-
litical motivation or a double standard when they are singled out for attention.
States also express concern that cases are presented too long after the events
that gave rise to them,21 hampering the State’s ability to defend itself or remedy
any violation that did occur. Procedural delays are troubling,22 as are repeti-
tious cases and other inefficiencies in the processing of petitions and requests for
precautionary measures. Equally problematic are issues of legitimacy and the
quality of decisions ultimately rendered.
This essay describes the Inter-American petition procedures and the issues
of legitimacy, transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness that they raise. In gen-
eral, the handling of petitions is dictated by the structure and functions of the
IACHR—as designed by the OAS member states—and can only be understood
in this context. Moreover, the problems in the petition system cannot be fully
separated from other issues, including the procedures used to nominate and elect
members of IACHR and the Court, concerns about functioning of the OAS gen-
erally, and the Anglo-Latin divide that exists in the organization.
The evidence of crisis is readily apparent. A process of “strengthening” the
system occupied the political bodies and the IACHR from 2010 through 2013,
with attempts made to curtail the functioning and powers of the IACHR.23
19 2013 Annual Report, supra note 18, ch. 2. In 2002, 979 petitions were filed. By 2013 the
number had increased to 2061.
20 Id.Cases pending decisions on admissibility andmerits rose from 976 in 1997 to 1753 in 2013.
Of the 2061 petitions received in 2013, only about thirty-five percent (736) were reviewed, leaving
sixty-five percent pending. Of those reviewed, 123 were accepted for processing, roughly seventeen
percent of those reviewed (and six percent of the total number filed), and 613 were rejected, eighty-
three percent of those reviewed.
21 Ariel Dulitzky, Too Little, Too Late: The Pace of Adjudication of The Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights, 35 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 131, 134 (2013) (noting the Isaza
Uribe case, which was at the Commission more than twenty years before an admissibility report was
adopted).
22 Id. at 136 (determining that it takes an average of six and a half years from initial submission of
a petition to the final merits decision, with four years devoted to reaching a decision on admissibility).
23 See generally Dinah L. Shelton, Advanced Introduction to International Human
Rights Law (2014) (discussing and analyzing the controversies discussed in this paragraph); Dou-
glass Cassel, Regional Human Rights Systems and State Pushback: The Case of the Inter-American
Human Rights System (2011–2013), 33 Hum. Rts. L.J. 1, 1–9 (2013).
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Venezuela denounced the Convention effective September 2013, and several
states failed to appear at recent hearings. Colombia announced in March 2014
that it would not comply with a request for a provisional measure. Earlier, Brazil
reacted with hostility and retaliatory actions in response to a precautionary re-
quest it received. Efforts are being mounted to create sub-regional bodies that
may divert resources and attention from the OAS, perhaps even instituting a
competing human rights system. Several states support moving the IACHR out
of the United States, ostensibly due to the United States’ failure to ratify Inter-
American human rights treaties. As a further sign of weak commitment to the
system, despite repeated attempts by the IACHR and the Court to obtain the
increased financial and human resources needed to exercise their functions, no
additional resources have been allocated.
II The Functions and Powers of the IACHR
The IACHR, an autonomous organ of the OAS,24 exists to “promote the ob-
servance and defense of human rights and to serve as an advisory body to the
Organization.”25 Its functions are generally divided into promotion and pro-
tection, a rather artificial distinction because efforts in one domain inevitably
impact the other. Certain functions listed in Article 18 of the IACHR Statute are
conferred with respect to all OAS member states.26 Article 19 adds functions
and powers in addressing state parties to the American Convention, and Article
20 concerns those member states that are not party to the Convention.27
Article 18, by itself, confers many mandates: developing awareness of hu-
man rights, making recommendations to governments to improve human rights,
preparing studies and reports, requesting information of governments, respond-
ing to inquiries from governments and providing advisory services to them,
preparing and submitting an annual report to the General Assembly, conduct-
ing on site observations in a state, and submitting a program-budget to the OAS
Secretary-General.28 To this is added the petition procedures referred to in Ar-
ticles 19 and 20: appearing before the Court and requesting it to issue provi-
sional measures, requesting advisory opinions of the Court, and preparing and
submitting draft protocols and amendments to the Convention.29 To these statu-
tory mandates must also be added the cumulative annual requests from the OAS
General Assembly for the IACHR to undertake particular studies or actions.
The numerous functions and powers conferred, without providing adequate
resources and staff, require the IACHR to designate priorities and make choices
24 Charter of the Organization of the American States, supra note 1, art. 106; IACHR Statute,
supra note 8, art. 1; IACHR Rules, supra note 9, art. 1.
25 IACHR Statute, supra note 8, art. 1(1).
26 Id. art. 18.
27 Id. arts. 19, 20. The division between the states governed by Articles 19 and 20 is generally
geographic, linguistic, and according to legal traditions. With the exception of Cuba, every state not
party to the Convention is among the English-speaking common law countries of North America.
Only two English-speaking Caribbean countries are currently parties to the Convention.
28 Id. art. 18.
29 Id. arts. 19, 20.
6 Notre Dame J. Int’l & Comp. L. [vol. 5:1
among countries, themes, and cases. Not every request for a country visit can be
accepted nor more than a small minority of requests for a hearing be granted so
long as the IACHR remains a part-time body with a small budget and staff. Con-
flicting pressures come from different stakeholders and create a certain identity
crisis at the IACHR. Petitioners and their representatives often see the IACHR
as serving a judicial function: deciding cases, recommending redress for victims,
halting imminently threatened harm, and recommending to governments mea-
sures to avoid future violations. States, in contrast, often seek to prioritize advi-
sory and promotional activities, calling for help in building national institutions,
laws, and policies; they prefer these non-confrontational approaches to condem-
nation resulting from decisions on the merits of cases.
The IACHR and the secretariat also are divided about priorities and the na-
ture of the IACHR’s work, in particular about the role and purpose of petitions.
Some persons consider the petition procedure the heart of the system, expos-
ing violations and providing redress for victims. Others see it as simply one of
the many IACHR functions, which is less a judicial organ than a monitoring
and compliance body aiming to improve human rights in the region. Cases may
not be the most effective way to fulfill this purpose. To some, the adoption of
thematic reports containing a summary of standards and jurisprudence, exam-
ples of violations, recommendations and best practices, has far greater impact
in improving human rights overall than does a decision on an individual case.
Country studies based on visits to the country are another important activ-
ity. They can address the entire context in which deficiencies and improvements
may be identified, recommendations made, and a constructive dialogue pursued.
Since 1961, the IACHR has made ninety-three country visits, with half a dozen
taking place in 2013, in addition to the many working meetings of a single com-
missioner. Of course, such visits may also reinforce the petition procedure by
providing ease of access to individuals seeking to file petitions,30 or giving the
IACHR an opportunity to gather evidence relevant to a large number of cases.
The increased visibility that comes with on-site visits also serves indirectly to
increase the number of cases filed, by informing the public of the existence and
procedures of the system.
The IACHR also holds hearings and working meetings during its sessions,
issues press releases, and conducts seminars and training sessions. During its
150th session in April 2014, the IACHR held fifty-five hearings and thirty work-
ing meetings. Notably, only three of the fifty-five hearings were in respect to a
pending case; the remaining hearings were thematic or contextual in nature. Also
during its sessions or at other times, members of the IACHR meet occasionally
with other regional and global human rights bodies and representatives, as well
as civil society and representatives of member states, and issue press releases.
This broad expanse of functions gives rise to a range of views about the pri-
mary function of the IACHR and the role of the petition procedure; these views
in turn shape attitudes about the importance of procedural regularity or “judi-
30 The on-site visit of December 2013 to the Dominican Republic by the plenary IACHR plus
staff members produced 3994 petitions and communications from individuals.
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cialization” of the system. On the one hand, many argue for retaining flexibility
and an almost ad hoc approach to processing petitions, allowing for maximum
negotiating ability, and accommodation to the needs and desires of petitioners.
On the other hand, many find that the adversarial nature of the petition process,
which in many cases leads to proceedings before the Court, and argue for proce-
dural regularity, predictability and consistency in the handling of cases, that is, a
more judicial approach to the petition process. Tension between these two views
and the disagreement about the proper place of petitions in the overall system
partly explain the current lack of coherence in the rules and procedures gov-
erning petitions, as well as disagreement about the nature and extent of further
needed reforms. In part, the various views of member states during the “strength-
ening” process reflected their own disagreement about the purpose and focus of
the IACHR.
III The Commission
The seven members of the IACHR are elected by the OAS General Assembly to a
four-year term, renewable once, from a list of candidates proposed byOASmem-
ber states. Commissioners serve in an individual capacity,31 and are intended to
be “persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the field of
human rights.”32 They are not required to have legal training and commission-
ers from other disciplines are elected periodically. Views about this arrangement
are linked to attitudes about the main role and function of the IACHR: Those
who emphasize the quasi-judicial nature of deciding petitions are less positive
about the service of non-lawyers, as their presence can delay processing or pe-
titions and produce poorly reasoned or decided decisions. For promotional and
other functions, however, many perceive the participation of persons from a
wide range of backgrounds as highly beneficial. In addition to differences in
skills and backgrounds, commissioners vary in their degree of independence and
impartiality. Some have held government positions before being nominated and
lack real independence.
Until quite recently, the IACHR was largely composed of Latin American
men, with fewwomen and few representatives from common law, English-speak-
ing countries. For a brief two-year period (2012–2014), the IACHR had a ma-
jority of female commissioners, three of them coming from English-speaking,
common law countries. Some of those present during this period perceived a
noticeable difference in the approach to cases.
Importantly, the IACHR is a part-time body that meets in short sessions three
times a year. It is rare for a commissioner to live near the headquarters of the
IACHR or visit the office when the IACHR is not in session. All of the commis-
sioners have full-time employment in addition to their IACHR duties.
The composition of the IACHR and its part-time nature have perceptibly
affected the attitude of some of the senior attorneys in the secretariat, who have
31 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, arts. 34, 36.
32 IACHR Statute, supra note 8, art. 2(1).
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referred to the commissioners as less qualified, more ideological, and therefore
less trustworthy to handle cases than the permanent staff. This attitude is not
always unwarranted, but it is too generalized. In any event, it has hampered
efforts to obtain direct participation of the IACHR in the processing of cases
raising issues of accountability and transparency.
The members of the IACHR have country assignments and thematic rappor-
teurships. The thematic rapporteurships held by commissioners focus on par-
ticular groups deemed especially vulnerable in the region.33 The assignment of
country rapporteurships to each commissioner has limited impact on the petition
procedures. Although in theory each commissioner meets during the sessions
with the staff attorneys to go over the pending cases concerning the countries
and thematic issues for which he or she is responsible, determining priorities, and
obtaining information about problems, these meetings usually are short briefings
and often end up cancelled due to time pressures. In practice, there is little or no
communication between the secretariat and the commissioners about petitions
between sessions.
IV The Secretariat
The American Convention, Article 40, specifies that the secretariat for the
IACHR “shall be furnished by the appropriate specialized unit of the General
Secretariat of the Organization.”34 The OAS Secretary General appoints the Ex-
ecutive Secretary.35 In other words, the secretariat does not function under the
authority of the IACHR,36 but under the general policies of the OAS, including
for recruitment, promotion, and termination. Some staff attorneys continue in
their permanent positions through numerous changes in the composition of the
IACHR.
The functions of the Executive Secretariat are extensive: prepare draft re-
ports, resolutions, studies, and any other work entrusted by the IACHR or its
president; receive and process correspondence, petitions, and communications;
and request information from parties. The Executive Secretary is assigned to co-
ordinate the work of the secretariat, prepare a draft budget and work program
in consultation with the President, report to the IACHR at the start of each ses-
sion on the activities of the secretariat, and implement decisions of the IACHR
and President. In practice, members of the secretariat, especially the Executive
33 The thematic rapporteurships in 2014 were: indigenous peoples; human rights defenders; per-
sons in detention; African descendants; women; children; migrant workers; and LGBTI. A special
rapporteur on freedom of expression is not a member of the IACHR, but a full time official selected
by the IACHR from among applicants for the position. The special rapporteur works under the
mandate of the IACHR.
34 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, art. 40.
35 IACHR Rules, supra note 9, art. 11. The 2013 revision to the Rules sets forth the procedure
by which the IACHR is to identify the best qualified candidate for the position, whose name is then
forwarded to the Secretary-General for appointment to a four-year term, renewable once.
36 The lack of authority over the secretariat is not limited to the IACHR; the European Court of
Human Rights and the African Commission similarly depend on the parent organization to provide
personnel for the secretariat.
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Secretary, also speak on behalf of the IACHR at conferences, meetings, and in
interviews with the press, attend workshops, meet with governments and civil
society, and engage in fundraising. Most importantly, as described in detail be-
low, the secretariat has almost sole authority over the processing and drafting of
decisions in respect to petitions and cases, as well as applications to and plead-
ings before the Court.
The secretariat is organized into various units. The Registry, created in 2007,
undertakes the initial review of petitions, the protection unit handles all requests
for precautionary measures, and a Court group is responsible for litigation be-
fore the Court. Other attorneys are assigned to one of four regional groups,
and are responsible for the states within their region, including the processing
of petitions and drafting reports. In this manner, the organization lends itself to
inefficiency and the potential for creeping bias. First, the organizational struc-
ture means that every attorney must be able to evaluate claims concerning every
right in every declaration and treaty as those may come up in petitions against
countries in the regional grouping. While this may be possible, it is less efficient
than having subject matter specialization, which can help produce expertise and
more consistent jurisprudence. Second, the geographic assignment means that
some attorneys develop either positive or negative views about particular states
in their group. On some occasions, value judgments appear in draft decisions
that suggest a certain bias towards the state or its government.
A Friendly Settlement Group aims to increase the valuable alternative dis-
pute resolution procedure whereby the IACHR assists the parties to a case to
resolve the pending matter expeditiously and fairly. Creation of the group was
coupled with an aim to hire four experienced attorneys to encourage more use
of friendly settlements to resolve cases without the prolonged process of a merits
determination and possible transmittal of the case to the Court. Friendly settle-
ments are more effective than such decisions and lessen the time required for
each case.37 Implementation of the program for the Friendly Settlement Group
has been hampered by the lack of funds to hire experienced settlement attorneys;
instead, a small number of existing staff have been moved into the new unit.
The problems of the secretariat are exacerbated by turnover, related to short-
term contracts, low morale, and other problems in management. As a result of
resignations, leaves of absence, and the failure of the OAS to provide additional
permanent positions, the secretariat has become short of staff. While turnover
is a problem, long-term service can also result in a certain resistance to reform
and improvement. The response is too often “we have always done it this way,”
without regard to whether that way continues to be appropriate to the rising
caseload and developments in human rights law, as well as the responsibilities
of the IACHR.
37 One study found that compliance rates with friendly settlements were almost double that with
Court judgments and five times the rate of compliance with IACHR decisions. See Fernando Basch
et al., The Effectiveness of the Inter-American System of Human Rights Protection: A Quantitative
Approach to its Functioning and Compliance with its Decisions, 7 Sur: Int’l J. on Hum. Rts. 9
(2010).
10 Notre Dame J. Int’l & Comp. L. [vol. 5:1
With a shortage of staff, the secretariat makes use of consultants, particu-
larly in drafting thematic reports. There is no inherent problem in doing so; in
fact, it is probably necessary to complete some of the priority projects while al-
lowing the secretariat to focus on the petitions. However, there has been a lack
of transparency in the recruitment and selection process, as well as in communi-
cations between the consultant and the IACHR: The IACHR often learns about
the appointment only after it has occurred, without having any opportunity to
comment on the applicants and their qualifications.38 For example, one consul-
tant’s completed draft had to be taken over and rewritten when it proved to be
error-ridden and unpublishable.
The structure, composition, and functioning of the IACHR human rights
system produces two foreseeable problems: inefficiency and illegitimacy. Ineffi-
ciency means the backlog grows, the process slows, and justice is not provided.
Lack of legitimacy is a product of the lack of real involvement of the IACHR
in the cases; the “hidden judiciary” has the files, prepares the memos, presents
the draft decisions, and the IACHR generally spends no more than an hour dis-
cussing the matter before largely approving the secretariat draft.
V Initial Processing
The requirements for filing a petition are both technical and substantive. Peti-
tioners must supply personal information and the details of the complaint, in-
cluding efforts to exhaust domestic remedies. The Rules of Procedure, Article 26,
make clear that the secretariat is responsible for the study and initial processing
of petitions lodged before the IACHR.39 Only if the secretariat has any doubt
about whether the submission fulfills the requirements set forth in Rule 28 is
it required to consult the IACHR.40 If there is a necessary element omitted in
the petition, the staff attorney may request the petitioner or representative to
provide the missing information.
A 2011 study undertaken by a team at the University of Texas School of Law
found that only ten to thirteen percent of new petitions pass the initial scrutiny
of the secretariat and are deemed receivable.41 In other words, up to ninety per-
cent of all petitions sent to the IACHR are summarily dismissed without any
Commission knowledge or oversight. No documentation is kept or data entries
made to record the subject matter, the states involved, or the reason for exclu-
sion. From the perspective of the IACHR, these communications might as well
never have been sent. It also does not appear that the petitioner is informed of
38 The secretariat might comment that this is to avoid possible lobbying or pressure to favor
one or another of the candidates for political or other improper motives. If the IACHR reviews the
candidates in a plenary meeting, however, it does not seem likely that this type of pressure would be
a problem.
39 IACHR Rules, supra note 9, art. 26.
40 Id.
41 Human Rights Clinic, Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Maximizing Justice, Mini-
mizing Delay: Streamlining Procedures of the Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights (2011), http://www.utexas.edu/law/clinics/humanrights/work/Maximizing_
Justice_Minimizing_Delay_at_the_IACHR.pdf.
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the reason for the rejection, though doing so might help to cure the defect and
allow for a receivable filing.
After review, when the petition is found to be among the ten to thirteen
percent that is complete and able to be processed, the secretariat registers the
date of receipt and sends an acknowledgement to the petitioner. Attorneys for
petitioners have complained that even the acknowledgement takes many months
or even years to be sent, leaving them uncertain as to whether the petition has
been lost or simply ignored. States have also objected to the time required for
initial processing, and have even argued to the Court that their rights to defense
are prejudiced by the passage of time.
Petitions are supposed to be studied in chronological order, but the Commis-
sion may expedite processing under circumstances set forth in Article 29, a list
that became longer with the 2013 revision to the Rules of Procedure.42 Indeed,
there are so many criteria for expedited consideration that most petitions can
fit within one or more of the categories: (1) when the passage of time would
deprive the petition of its effectiveness because the alleged victim is older or a
child, terminally ill, subject to the death penalty or connected to a precaution-
ary or provisional measure in effect; (2) when the alleged victims are persons
deprived of liberty; (3) when the State formally expresses its intention to enter
into friendly settlement negotiations; or (4) when the resolution of the petition
could address serious structural situations that would have an impact on the
enjoyment of human rights or promote legislation or state practices and thus
avoid repetitious complaints. Commissioners will sometimes push to expedite
particular cases they feel are particularly important and fit within one of the cat-
egories. The issue sometimes ends up being discussed in a plenary session when
those processing the petition are not in agreement. At the opposite extreme, it is
not unknown for cases to be delayed in the secretariat because they are deemed
politically sensitive or to wait out a particular commissioner’s term.
In practice, the initial processing before a petition is sent to the relevant state
may take up to two years. Meanwhile, the backlog increases. To address the
problem with initial processing, the secretariat proposed in 2014 that this initial
review of petitions be conducted primarily by a new group of interns approved
for appointment by the OAS, interns who are not necessarily legally-trained.
Some commissioners have raised questions about why they do not receive peti-
tions when they are initially filed, or at least when the preliminary examination
has been completed. The answers range from cost of duplicating and translat-
ing files, lack of computer resources,43 and concerns about security, to the time
42 IACHR Rules, supra note 9, art. 29.
43 The secretariat initiated a Petition and Case Management System (PCMS) in 2002, an elec-
tronic database to track the progress of petitions and cases, but access to this is not provided to the
members of the Commission. In May 2010, the system added a Document Management System to
track and file documents filed by either a party or the Commission, linking the documents to the
petition or case, but only to petitions and documents filed after June 2010. No resources exist to
provide an electronic record of earlier petitions and documents. Although the intention has been
stated to eventually make it possible for all petitioners and states to have access to information re-
lated to their petition or case, no mention has been made of making the same information available
to the IACHR.
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required and priorities given other matters. The inability of commissioners to
participate in cases from the beginning means that they are less informed than
they should be about the details of cases they must decide.
VI Precautionary Measures
In receiving and reviewing petitions, or upon the filing of a separate request,
the IACHR, pursuant to Article 25 of its Rules of Procedure, may, at its own
initiative or at the request of a party, request that a state adopt precautionary
measures concerning serious and urgent situations presenting a risk of irrepara-
ble harm to persons or to the subject matter of a pending petition or a case before
the organs of the Inter-American system.44 As the number of petitions submitted
to the IACHR has grown each year, so has the number of requests for precau-
tionary measures: from 265 in 2005 to 400 in 2013, slightly down from the
448 requests filed in 2012.45 Within several years, the Commission has issued
more requests than any other international human rights body. The Commission
granted or extended fifty-three precautionary measures in 1998 and early 1999,
sixty in 1999 and early 2000, fifty-two during the rest of 2000, and fifty-four
during 2001, making a total of 219 measures in just four years. In contrast, the
IACHR granted only twenty-six requests in 2013, the lowest number in fifteen
years, despite having the third highest number of requests. It is speculative, but
quite likely, that the fewer favorable responses reflects the “chilling effect” of
Brazil’s campaign from 2011 to 2013 against the IACHR’s use of precautionary
measures following the Belo Monte matter.46
The number of precautionary measures is well below the number of individ-
uals protected because the measures can protect either one person or a group of
persons, often covering entire populations or communities.47 The total number
44 IACHR Rules, supra note 9, art. 25.
45 2013 Annual Report, supra note 18, at 56.
46 On April 1, 2011, the IACHR granted precautionary measures for the members of the indige-
nous communities of the Xingu River Basin in Pará, Brazil. The request was based on allegations
that the life and physical integrity of the beneficiaries were at risk due to the impact of the con-
struction of the Belo Monte hydroelectric power plant. The Inter-American Commission requested
that Brazil immediately suspend the licensing process for the Belo Monte Hydroelectric Plant project
and stop any construction work from moving forward until the state: (1) conducted free, informed
consultations, in good faith, culturally appropriate, and with the aim of reaching an agreement;
(2) guaranteed that the indigenous communities have access beforehand to the project’s Social and
Environmental Impact Study, in an accessible format, including translation into the respective in-
digenous languages; (3) adopted measures to protect the life and physical integrity of the members
of the indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation of the Xingu Basin, and to prevent the spread of
diseases and epidemics among the indigenous. This includes any diseases derived from the massive
influx of people into the region as well as the exacerbation of transmission vectors of water-related
diseases such as malaria. The request was modified on July 29, 2011, after information was received
from the state and the petitioners. As a consequence of receiving the request, the state withdrew its
OAS ambassador and nominee for the IACHR, and halted its financial contributions. It also joined
other critics of the IACHR in launching the “strengthening” process to reform the Commission.
47 For example, in a single request involving Paraguay on August 8, 2001, the Commission re-
quested that precautionary measures be adopted on behalf of 255 minors who had been held at
the Panchito López Reeducation Center for Minors. See Annual Rep. of the Inter-Am. Comm’n on
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of persons protected by precautionarymeasures is in fact impossible to determine
because sometimes, a community is identified without specifying the number of
individuals it contains.48 This has been one of the objections of states to the re-
quests issued: They claim that it is impossible to protect a group that is neither
identified nor easily identifiable. The 2013 revision to the Rules specifies now
that “precautionary measures may protect persons or groups of persons, as long
as the beneficiary or beneficiaries may be determined or determinable through
their geographic location or membership in or association with a group, people,
community or organization.”49
While the IACHR probably has authority to accept complaints on behalf of
identifiable members of a group,50 the Court has taken a narrow view on this is-
sue when presentedwith requests for provisional measures by the Commission.51
The Court has insisted on the names of specific persons before granting the re-
quested measures.52 Most recently, in the case of Haitian and Haitian-Origin
Dominican Persons in the Dominican Republic,53 the Court stated:
[T]his Court deems it indispensable to identify individually the per-
sons in danger of suffering irreparable damage, for which reason it
is not feasible to order provisional measures without specific names,
for protecting generically those in a given situation or those who
are affected by certain measures; however, it is possible to protect
individualized members of a community.54
Hum. Rts., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L./V/II.114, doc. 5 rev., ch. 3, ¶ 48 (2001).
48 For example, on June 4, 2001, the IACHR granted precautionary measures on behalf of Kimi
Domicó, Uldarico Domicó, Argel Domicó, Honorio Domicó, Adolfo Domicó, Teofan Domicó, Mar-
iano Majore, Delio Domicó, Fredy Domicó, and “other [unnamed] members of the Embera Katio
indigenous community of Alto Sinú” who had been abducted from the community’s main town and
neighboring areas. The state was asked, as a matter of urgency, to take the steps necessary to clarify
the whereabouts of these persons and to protect their lives and persons; to take the steps needed
to protect the other members of the Embera Katio indigenous community of Alto Sinú, working in
collaboration with the petitioners; and to investigate, judge, and punish those responsible for the
attacks perpetrated against the community. After the state replied, the parties continued to submit
information and comments in connection with these precautionary measures.
49 IACHR Rules, supra note 9, art. 25(3).
50 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, art. 44 (providing that “[a]ny person
or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more member
states of the Organization, may lodge petitions with the Commission containing denunciations or
complaints of violation of this Convention by a State Party”). Commission Rule of Procedure art.
23 uses similar language with respect to petitions brought under the American Declaration. While
the petition must be signed by the individual lodging the complaint, nowhere is it required that the
victims be identified by name. See IACHR Rules, supra note 9, art. 28.
51 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, art. 63(2) (authorizing the Court to
adopt provisional measures “with respect to a case not yet submitted to the Court,” at the request
of the Commission).
52 See, e.g., Álvarez v. Colombia, Provisional Measures, Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. E) No. 2 (Jan. 21, 1998); Digna Ochoa y Plácido Regarding Mexico, Provisional Measures,
Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E) No. 2 (Nov. 17, 1999).
53 Haitian and Haitian-Origin Dominican Persons in the Dominican Republic, Provisional Mea-
sures, Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E) (Aug. 18, 2000) [hereinafter The Haitian
Case].
54 Id., “Considering,” ¶ 8.
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In addition to spelling out more clearly the criteria for precautionary mea-
sures, the 2013 Rules changes further “judicialize” the procedure by insisting on
a reasoned decision with a published vote of the commissioners, and set forth
the procedure for lifting, prolonging, or amending the request. The new Rule
also indicates that a decision by the Court not to grant provisional measures
will have the effect of terminating any IACHR measures previously granted.
In practice, precautionary measures are almost always handled by a staff
attorney reviewing and then communicating by email a summary of the request
and response of the government, if any, to members of the Commission, along
with a recommendation on whether the request should be granted or not. One
innovation that may or may not be continued was adopted in 2011, requiring
that any request for precautionary measures be transmitted in its original form
immediately to the country rapporteur. Recommendations of the protection unit
are almost always followed by the Commission.
VII Admissibility
Once a petition is registered and sent to the state in question, the state is sup-
posed to send its response within three months from the date of transmittal. This
time limit is not enforced. The rules provide for extensions of four months when
requested by the state. In fact, there are often multiple exchanges of pleadings
between the parties over many years before a petition is deemed ready for a
decision on admissibility. None of the information is automatically transmitted
to the Commissioners, or even to the country rapporteur or relevant thematic
rapporteur. The 2009 revisions to the Rules of Procedure provided for the cre-
ation of a Working Group on Admissibility, a provision retained in the 2013
reform, Article 35.55 The Working Group is supposed to be composed of three
or more commissioners who are to study the admissibility of petitions between
sessions and make recommendations to the plenary. It does not appear that such
a group has ever been established; instead, the secretariat prepares draft reports
on admissibility and inadmissibility for presentation to the plenary during regu-
lar sessions. In large measure, the IACHR appears to have little time to scrutinize
the secretariat’s decisions on the admissibility and merits of petitions. The Court
also must sometimes press hard to overcome staff attorneys’ resistance to change
conclusions already reached.
As general matter, there are legitimacy concerns because the commissioners
rarely, if ever, see the original petitions; and they are not given copies of the
pleadings and evidence to evaluate independently. They receive draft disposi-
tions prepared by attorneys (or interns) in the secretariat. Often, the Commis-
sion receives these the same day as, or at most a few days prior to, the discussion
scheduled on the matter. The reason usually given is that translations have not
been completed in time for earlier distribution. Translation is a constant prob-
lem, not simply in timing, but in the quality of translations. There are certainly
55 IACHR Rules, supra note 9, art. 35.
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very skilled translators, but not enough of them; and others who are brought in
that often return quite flawed documents.
In preparing admissibility drafts, the secretariat sometimes appears to take
a “kitchen sink” approach to the matter, without regard to the rights invoked
by those who filed the petition. Having the legal staff assist in identifying the
violations that emerge from the facts can no doubt benefit applicants who have
no representation and are unfamiliar with the system. However, experienced
and knowledgeable non-governmental organizations (NGOs) very often repre-
sent clients concerned with a specific issue involving a guaranteed right. Despite
this, admissibility drafts are presented, listing any and all rights that, even tan-
gentially, might possibly be raised by the facts alleged. The staff attorneys will
also add victims to those listed in the petition. The results are sometimes very
far removed from the core issues in a petition and can distract or detract from
the egregiousness of the conduct at the heart of the matter (a genocidal massacre
alleged to violate freedom of assembly, for example, or dismissal of an army offi-
cer without a proper hearing deemed to affect the “honor and reputation” of his
aunt due to hostility from the neighbors). In fact, the past overuse of jura novit
curia (the court knows the law) has not infrequently undermined the coherence
and impact of some decisions and added to the delays in proceedings.
The principle jura novit curia generally signifies the judicial power to address
a case based on a law or legal theory not presented by the parties.56 To some,
its application represents the legal aspect of justice because it ensures that a
party will not lose a case simply because of a failure to invoke the correct legal
ground.57 It may also be linked to notions of equity, whereby the court can
recognize rights that an applicant or petitioner may not have invoked or may
have not even been aware pertain to the issues before the court.58
56 Mirjan R. Damška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Ap-
proach to the Legal Process 116 (1986). Another author calls the adage a “presumption” that
the court knows the law. James R. Fox, Dictionary of International and Comparative Law
(1992) (“This maxim controls the manner in which the International Court handles questions of in-
ternational law. As a consequence, the court is not restricted to the law presented by the parties, but
is free to undertake its own research.”). Fox does not mention another general principle of law: that
all subjects of a legal system are presumed to know the law and ignorance of the law is no defense.
How this general knowledge differs from the presumed knowledge of the judge is unexamined.
57 Sofie Geeroms, Foreign Law in Civil Litigation: A Comparative and Functional
Analysis (2004). See also Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive
Litigants of an Opportunity to be Heard, 39 San Diego L. Rev. 1253, 1256 (2002) (describing the
practices of appellate courts in the United States when they find a point of law has been wrongly
stated or omitted by the parties, practices that range from ignoring the issue or deeming it waived
to noting the issue and remanding the case for consideration of it, requesting supplemental briefing
or deciding the issue without briefing).
58 Black’s Law Dictionary translates the principle as “the court knows the law; the court recog-
nizes rights.” Black’s Law Dictionary 852 (6th ed. 1990). Douglas Brooker notes that the second
part of this definition may support the creation of equitable remedies:
The translation the “court recognises rights” and its association with the maxim “no
wrong without a remedy,” . . . invalidates a defence based on the absence of law
by legitimising a decision based on a judge-created rule imposed ex post facto to
remedy a wrong, notwithstanding no law was breached. The factual wrong alleged
in this application of jura novit curia is found by a court nonetheless as sufficiently
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Use of jura novit curia is more widespread in civil law jurisdictions than in
those systems based on the common law. F.A. Mann suggested, in fact, that in
continental legal systems, the principle requires a judge to apply the appropriate
legal rules to the facts presented to the court by the parties, and if necessary,
engage in its own legal research in order to identify the pertinent rules. Mann
contrasted this system with those of the common law, in which the judge relies
on the submissions advanced by counsel for the parties, who frame the issues as
they deem best suited to advance their clients’ claims and interests. According
to Mann, “perhaps the most spectacular feature of English procedure is that the
rule curia novit legem has never been and is not part of English law.”59 In an
opinion submitted to the European Court of Justice, Advocate General Francis
Jacobs contended that the differences between the systems had been exaggerated:
Civil law courts, jura novit curia notwithstanding, may not exceed
the limits of the case as defined by the claims of the parties and may
not generally raise a new point involving new issues of fact. A com-
mon law court, too, will sua sponte take a point which is a matter of
public policy; it will, for instance, refuse to enforce an illegal contract
even if no party raises this point.60
The European Court of Human Rights has decided more than 10,000 mat-
ters since its creation. It has rarely applied jura novit curia, although it accepts
that it can, in principle, do so.61 In its jurisprudence, it has referred to jura novit
curia in only thirty-two cases, with many references found in dissenting opin-
ions,62 or inadmissibility decisions.63 Other judgments or decisions simply refer
egregious to justify “recognising” protection from the wrong as a “right” leading to
the provision of a remedy in equity.
Douglas Brooker, Va Savoir!: The Adage Jura Novit Curia in Contemporary France (pt. 1), 47 (Be-
press Legal Series, Working Paper No. 845, 2005), http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/845.
59 F.A. Mann, Fusion of the Legal Professions?, 93 Law Q. Rev. 367, 369 (1977). Mann was
critical of a decision of the European Commission of Human Rights, which stated, “it is a gener-
ally recognised principle of law that it is for the court to know the law (jura novit curia) . . . the
established practice of the German courts whereby the parties are not necessarily invited to make
oral submissions on all points of law which may appear significant to the courts does not constitute
an infringement of the principle of ‘fair hearing’ within the meaning of [Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights].” X & Co. (Eng.) v. Germany, App. No. 3147/67, Eur. Comm’n
H.R. (1968), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-3046.
60 Case C-430/93, Van Schijndel v. Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten, 1995 E.C.R.
I-4705, ¶¶ 34–35.
61 Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2), 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 12 (2009); see also Powell v. United Kingdom,
172 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 29 (1990) (“The Court is the master of the characterization to be given
in law to the facts submitted to its examination.”).
62 Hermi v. Italy, 2006-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 91, 126 (Zupančič, J., dissenting) (concerning the role of
judges and prosecutors in criminal cases); Akdivar v. Turkey, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1192 (Golkulu,
J., dissenting) (referring to jura novit curia in reference to exhaustion of local remedies); McFarlane
v. Ireland, App. No. 31333/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010) (Lopez Guerra, J., dissenting) (on exhaustion
of local remedies), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-100413.
63 See Pentiacova v. Moldova, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 357; Nelissen v. The Netherlands, App.
No. 6051/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-104357.
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to domestic courts’ application of the principle,64 sometimes as a result of efforts
by creative lawyers to avoid the European Court’s jurisprudence on exhaustion
of local remedies.65 Representatives of applicants to the European Court have
argued unsuccessfully that they should not have to present the same violations
to local courts because the principle jura novit curia means that the domestic
judges should know and apply the European Convention without a party in-
voking it.66 Thus, the applicant’s failure to invoke the Convention in substance
should not be deemed non-exhaustion of local remedies. The European Court
has consistently rejected this argument.
In its rare applications of jura novit curia, the European Court has insisted
on the right of the parties to be heard, and normally will accept the applicant’s
characterization of a case. The European Court also maintains a focus on the
main issues raised, often deciding that it is unnecessary to examine other alleged
violations, even when raised by the applicant.67 Finally, the European Court has
consistently held that the failure to succeed in domestic courts does not necessar-
ily mean denial of access to justice or lack of due process in the local venues.68
Only once in its history has the European Court added ECHRArticle 13 through
64 Eskelinen v. Finland, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (2006); Tarnawczyk v. Poland, App. No. 27480/02,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-102119; Turek v. Slovakia,
44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 43 (2004); Nuutinen v. Finland, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15 (2007); Marčíc v. Ser-
bia, App. No. 17556/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-83006;
Hellborg v. Sweden, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3 (2004); Jusufoski v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo-
nia, App. No. 32715/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-92346;
AGRO-B SPOL. S R.O. v. Czech Republic, App. No. 740/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-103573. In Kononov v. Latvia, the Court looked to its power to review
the judgments of domestic authorities when it is not the domestic legislation, but the Convention
itself, that expressly refers to the domestic law. The Court noted that in such cases, a failure to
comply with the domestic legislation may in itself entail a violation of the Convention. Accordingly,
by virtue of the jura novit curia principle, the Court could and should exercise a power to review
whether the law has been complied with. Kononov v. Latvia, App. No. 36376/04, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-87934, aff’d, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 35; see also
Benham v. United Kingdom, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 753, ¶ 41; Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004-IV Eur.
Ct. H.R. 129, ¶ 66.
65 The Court’s case law requires an applicant to “plead in substance” before domestic courts the
same violations of law (notably violation of the European Convention) later presented in Strasbourg.
Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 557, ¶ 34 (1981); Cardot v. France, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep.
853 (1991).
66 Wv. Austria, App. No. 10757/84, 56 Eur. Comm’nH.R. Dec. &Rep. 36 (1988); Lelas v. Croa-
tia, App. No. 55555/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010); X v. Germany, App. No. 9228/80, 11 Eur. Comm’n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 132 (1982). In van Oosterwijck, applicant argued that the Belgian courts were
bound by the principle jura novit curia to apply the Convention, even though he had not requested
them to do so. “The Court is not persuaded by this argument. The fact that the Belgian courts might
have been able, or even obliged, to examine the case of their own motion under the Convention
cannot be regarded as having dispensed the applicant from pleading before them the Convention or
arguments to the same or like effect.” Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, App. No 7654/76, 3 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 581, ¶ 39 (1979).
67 Thus, if the European Court finds a right violated, such as freedom from inhuman or degrading
treatment or freedom of expression, it rarely examines the issue of discrimination in addition to that
of the specific violation. The Court seems to do so only when the applicant introduces sufficient
evidence that the violation was specifically motivated by discrimination. Compare Arslan v. Turkey,
31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 9 (1999) with Nachova v. Bulgaria, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
68 See, e.g., Silver v. United Kingdom, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 347 (1983).
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application of jura novit curia. Its record in this respect is in sharp contrast to
the practice of the IACHR and the Inter-American Court, which have made ex-
tensive use of jura novit curia. In Hilaire, the Inter-American Court invoked the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) precedents in stating that it had not only the
right, but also the obligation, to find a violation of any provision of the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights found to be applicable.69 The Inter-American
Court’s approach, particularly during its most activist phase in the early 2000s,
influenced the Commission to increasingly use jura novit curia until the end of
the decade.70
Many reasons might explain such an extensive use of the principle. First,
petitioners might be unfamiliar with the system and not represented by legal
counsel. In such instances, petitions might not refer to any specific right in the
American Declaration or an applicable treaty, or may refer to non-applicable
instruments.71 As neither the Convention,72 nor the Commission’s Rules of Pro-
cedure,73 requires reference to specific rights that may have been violated by the
alleged facts, it becomes the task of the IACHR to determine admissibility in
reference to guaranteed rights.74 It does not appear to make a difference, how-
ever, that the petitioner has legal representation, even when the representative
69 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5; Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago,Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94, ¶¶ 107, 187 (June 21, 2002).
70 The 2006 Annual Report of the Commission included 56 admissibility reports and 8 merits
determinations. At the admissibility stage, the Commission used jura novit curia in just under half
(48%) of the reports declaring a matter admissible. In 2010, the IACHR decided in favor of the
admissibility of 74 cases; in 38 of them, it added rights and/or victims to the claim presented by the
petitioners, amounting to more than 50% of admissible petitions being altered through the use of
jura novit curia.
71 In Vélez Loor v. Panama, the petition alleged violation by Panama of Articles 5, 7, 8, 10, 21,
and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights in conjunction with Article 1(1), and Arti-
cles 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Sub-
jected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Commis-
sion declared the case admissible under Articles 1(1), 2, 5, 8, 21, and 25 of the American Convention,
but substituted for the Torture Declaration Articles 1, 6, and 8 of the Inter-American Convention
to Prevent and Punish Torture. Vélez Loor v. Panama, Petition 92-04, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Re-
port No. 95/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006); see also Peirano Basso v. Uruguay, Case
12.553, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 86/09, OEA/Ser.L./V/II, doc. 51 corr. 1 (2009). In Pe-
riano Basso, petitioners invoked Articles 5(1) and 5(2), 7(1) and 7(3), 8(1), 9, 24, 25, and 29 of the
American Convention on Human Rights in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the same Convention.
The petitioners further alleged violations of Articles II, XVIII, XXV and XXVI of the American Dec-
laration on the Rights and Duties of Man; Articles 1, 2, 6, and 8 of the Inter-American Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Torture; Articles 9, 14, and 26 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights; Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; and the
United Nations Minimum Standards for the Treatment of Prisoners. The Commission admitted the
case only on alleged violations of American Convention Articles 7, 8, 9, and 25.
72 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, arts. 46, 47 (setting forth the admissi-
bility requirements).
73 IACHR Rules, supra note 9.
74 See Valbuena v. Colombia, Petition 668-05, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 87/06,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006); see also Nueva Venecia Massacre v. Colombia, Petition
1306-05, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 88/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006),
which stated:
The Commission considers that the facts the petitioner is reporting regarding the al-
leged violation of the right to life, the right to humane treatment, the right to a fair
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is an experienced and knowledgeable litigant before the Inter-American bodies
and can be expected to frame allegations to present the petitioner’s best case.
Second, the use of jura novit curia could reflect a broad view of the IACHR’s
function to monitor and promote compliance with the full range of human rights
through the case system. Unlike the United Nations human rights treaty system,
the Inter-American system does not require periodic reporting by states. The case
system is one of the main avenues through which the IACHR becomes aware of
violations occurring in OASmember states and can recommend to them not only
redress, but also measures to ensure non-repetition of violations. This does not
explain, however, the huge discrepancy between the practice of the European
Court and that of the Inter-American bodies.
A third factor promoting extensive use of jura novit curia may be a nega-
tive view by the IACHR and the Inter-American Court of the judicial systems
of many countries in the hemisphere. In both 2006 and 2010, the IACHR most
frequently added Convention Articles 8 (due process),75 and 25 (access to jus-
tice),76 through the use of jura novit curia.77 Unlike the European Court, the
trial and the right to judicial guarantees could tend to establish violations of the rights
protected under articles 4, 5, 8.1 and 25 of the American Convention, in combination
with Article 1(1) thereof.
Id. ¶ 33. See also González v. Argentina, Petition 618-01, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 15/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006); Paredes Costa v. Dominican Republic, Petition
12.174, Inter-Am Comm’n H.R., Report No. 48/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006).
75 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5. Article 8(1) provides:
Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable
time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by
law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or
for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other
nature.
Id. Paragraph 2 contains fair trial guarantees for criminal prosecutions. For petitions in which Ar-
ticle 8 was added, see, e.g., Dos Santos Nascimento v. Brazil, Petition 1068-03, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., Report No. 84/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006); Union of Ministry of Education
Workers (ATRAMEC) v. El Salvador, Petition 71-03, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 23/06,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006); Arbenz Guzmán v. Guatemala, Petition 569-99, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 27/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006).
76 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5. Article 25, entitled “Judicial Protec-
tion,” expresses the right to a remedy:
Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse,
to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his funda-
mental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this
Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons acting
in the course of their official duties.
Id. art. 25(1). For cases adding Article 25, often in connection with Article 8, see, for exam-
ple, Barbani Duarte v. Uruguay, Petition 997-03, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 123/06,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006) (adding Articles 8 and 25 in case concerning bank fraud);
Mohamad Capote v. Venezuela, Petition 4348-02, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 96/06,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006). In Mohamad Capote, the Commission stated:
Although the petitioners did not make any express allegations to that effect, in appli-
cation of the principle of jura novit curia the Commission finds that the facts recounted
in connection with the alleged delay and lack of due diligence may tend to establish a
violation of the rights to a fair trial and to judicial protection, recognized in Articles 8,
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Inter-American Court seems more willing to assume a deprivation of due process
or access to justice when the petitioner did not receive a remedy in the domestic
courts. When petitioners have alleged violation of Articles 8 and 25, alone or in
connection with other rights, the IACHR has been less likely to use jura novit
curia.78
Fourth, as in Europe, one may also infer concern with ensuring that like sit-
uations result in similar decisions, providing equality of treatment to petitioners
and governments. For example, forced disappearance and torture cases are usu-
ally deemed to involve the same set of rights, irrespective of the rights invoked
by the petitioner.79 In cases of forced disappearances, the IACHR normally adds
25 and 1(1) of the American Convention, to the detriment of the alleged victims and
their next of kin.
Mohamad Capote, Report No. 96/06, ¶ 85; see also Jimenez Morgan v. Costa Rica, Petition 469-05,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 178/10, OEA/Ser.L./V/II, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2010); Núñez Naranjo
v. Ecuador, Petition 1101-03, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 2/10, OEA/Ser.L./V/II, doc. 5
rev. 1 (2010); Muelle Flores v. Peru, Petition 147-98, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 106/10,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2010).
77 See, e.g., Carvalho de Mello v. Brazil, Petition 1454-06, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 127/10, OEA/Ser.L./V/II, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2010) (adding by jura novit curia possible violations
of Convention Articles 5.1 and 8 with respect to the family members of the alleged victims); Es-
tadero “El Aracatazzo” Massacre v. Colombia, Petition 1325-05, Inter-Am Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 47/10, OEA/Ser.L./V/II, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2010); Bueno Bonnet v. Colombia, Petition 11.990, Inter-
Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 124/10, OEA/Ser.L./V/II, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2010).
78 Violation of Convention Articles 8 and 25, as well as other rights, were alleged in thirty-
three of thirty-six matters in 2006. In none of these cases did the Commission apply jura novit cu-
ria. See, e.g., Sandoval v. Argentina, Petition 619-01, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 16/06,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006); Persons Deprived of Freedom at Urso Branco Prison v.
Brazil, Petition 394-02, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 81/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4
rev. 1 (2006); Da Silva v. Brazil, Petition 641-03, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 83/06,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006); Zúñiga Vásquez v. Colombia, Petition 458-04, Inter-
Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 20/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006); Members of José
Alvéar Restrepo Lawyers’ Collective v. Colombia, Petition 12.380, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Re-
port No. 55/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006); Workers Belonging to the “Associa-
tion of Fertilizer Workers” (FERTICA) Union v. Costa Rica, Petition 2893-02, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., Report No. 21/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006); El Mozote Massacre v. El
Salvador, Case 10.720, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 24/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4
rev. 1 (2006); Ochoa López v. Guatemala, Petition 1083-05, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 58/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006); Charles v. Haiti, Petition 81-06, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 65/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006); Garífuna Cmty. of
“Triunfo de la Cruz” v. Honduras, Petition 906-03, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 29/06,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006); Pacheco León v. Honduras, Petition 848-04, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 118/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006); Arce v. Mexico,
Petition 1176-03, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 31/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1
(2006); Wald Jaramillo v. Panama, Petition 875-03, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 34/06,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006); Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela, Petition 577-05, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 36/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006); Echaniz Alcorta v.
Venezuela, Petition 562.03, Inter-Am. Comm’nH.R., Report No. 37/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4
rev. 1 (2006); Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela, Petition 549-05, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 38/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006); AlfonzoMartínez v. Venezuela, Petition 73-03,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 39/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006); Reverón Tru-
jillo v. Venezuela, Petition 406-05, Inter-Am Comm’n H.R., Report No. 60/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127,
doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006).
79 With respect to disappearances, the Commission has followed a general practice of finding
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Convention Article 3, the right to juridical personality,80 based on the Court’s
jurisprudence,81 as well as other rights and other Conventions.82
Finally, the Court has substantially influenced the IACHR’s use of jura novit
curia, for example, in routinely adding Convention Articles 1 and 2, which con-
tain the general obligations of state parties.83 The IACHR may substitute one of
these generic obligations for another,84 or add to the obligations invoked by the
petitioner.85
violations of Articles 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 25, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2; as well as Articles I and
III of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons. See, e.g., Osorio Rivera
v. Peru, Petition 11.845, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 76/10, OEA/Ser.L./V/II, doc. 5 rev. 1
(2010).
80 See, e.g., González Arroyo v. Colombia, Case 11.144, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 123/10, OEA/Ser.L./V/II, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2010); Garzón Guzmán v. Ecuador, Petition 11.587,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 70/10, OEA/Ser.L./V/II, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2010) (adding Articles
3, 5, and 7, as well as Article 1 of the Forced Disappearances Convention); Guachalá Chimbó v.
Ecuador, Petition 247-07, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 141/10, OEA/Ser.L./V/II, doc. 5
rev. 1 (2010); Cuellar Sandoval v. El Salvador, Petition 1138-04, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 107/10, OEA/Ser.L./V/II, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2010), Gutierrez Olvera v. Mexico, Petition 497-03,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 147/10, OEA/Ser.L./V/II, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2010).
81 In the seminal judgment Velásquez-Rodríguez, the Inter-American Court signaled a broad ap-
proach to the phenomenon of forced disappearances, stating:
The phenomenon of disappearances is a complex form of human rights violation that
must be understood and confronted in an integral fashion. . . . The forced disappear-
ance of human beings is a multiple and continuous violation of many rights under the
Convention that the States Parties are obligated to respect and guarantee.
Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶¶ 150, 155
(July 29, 1988).
82 For example:
In accordance with the principle of jura novit curia, the IACHR also rules these pe-
titions admissible with respect to possible violations of Articles 3 (for the allegedly
disappeared victims), 7 (for all alleged victims), 19 (for the alleged victims who were
children at the time of the facts) and 24 (for all alleged victims) of the American Con-
vention, to the detriment of the respective alleged victims; Articles 5.1 and 8 of the
American Convention, to the detriment of the family members of the alleged victims
and the surviving alleged victim. Moreover, also by virtue of the principle of jura novit
curia, the Inter-American Commission declares these petitions admissible with regard
to Articles 1, 6, 7 and 8 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish
Torture.
De Souza v. Brazil, Petition P-1448-06, Inter Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 126/10,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II, doc. 5 rev. 1, ¶ 3 (2010).
83 Sometimes only these articles are added. See, e.g., Canales Ciliezar v. Honduras, Petition 691-
04, Inter Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 71/10, OEA/Ser.L./V/II, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2010) (admitting the
case on Articles 8 and 25, adding Articles 1(1) and 2 pursuant to jura novit curia).
84 Members of the Indigenous Cmty. of Ananas v. Brazil, Petition 62-02, Inter Am. Comm’n
H.R., Report No. 80/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006); Ictech Guifarro v. Honduras,
Petition 2570-02, Inter Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 30/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1
(2006); Escobar Ledezma v. Mexico, Petition 1175-03, Inter Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 32/06,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1, ¶ 39 (2006) (“under the principle of jura novit curia, the Inter-
American Commission will analyze claims addressing Article 2 of the American Convention”).
85 Fiallos Navarro v. Nicaragua, Petition 799-04, Inter Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 59/06,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1, ¶ 51 (2006) (“The Commission, invoking the principle of jura
novit curia, will analyze the possible violations in conjunction with the general obligations set out
in Articles 1 and 2 of the American Convention.”).
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One use of jura novit curia is to add rights and obligations from other rele-
vant Inter-American treaties if the petitioner fails to refer to them.86 In the case
of Heliodoro-Portugal v. Panama,87 neither the IACHR nor the victim’s repre-
sentatives alleged a failure to comply with the provisions of the Inter-American
Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, which Panama had ratified on
February 28, 1996.88 Instead, they based the decision exclusively on the Ameri-
can Convention. Citing the jura novit curia principle, the Court decided to rule
not only with regard to Article 7 of the American Convention, but also with re-
gard to the provisions of the Forced Disappearance Convention. Following the
Court’s initiative in cases involving disappearances, torture, or violence against
women, the IACHR began adding the specific specialized treaties on those top-
ics as well.89 The practice has amounted thus far to a mere formality, because
neither the IACHR nor the Court has analyzed the provisions of the additional
treaty or indicated why the facts demonstrate it has been violated. It seems to be
taken for granted that the provisions mean exactly the same thing as the articles
of the American Convention.
The Court excludes the presentation of new facts once a case has been sub-
mitted to it by the IACHR.90 But the Court holds that the petitioners may in-
voke new rights because, “they are the holders of all the rights embodied in the
American Convention and, if this were not admissible, it would be an undue re-
striction o[n] their condition [as] subjects of international human rights law.”91
Judge Cançado Trindade argued at great length in favor of liberal recourse to
jura novit curia, and proposed that the Court accept new arguments and issues
presented by petitioners late in the litigation, characterizing the matter as an
issue of access to justice.92 Thus, for about a decade, the Court repeatedly per-
86 Unlike the U.N. system, the Inter-American continues to have a single monitoring commission
for all of its treaties, rather than creating a separate treaty body for each major agreement.
87 Heliodoro-Portugal v. Panama, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 186, ¶¶ 105–13 (Aug. 12, 2008).
88 Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, O.A.S.T.S. No. 68 (June 9,
1994) (entered into force Mar. 28, 1996).
89 See Jaguaco Asimbaya v. Ecuador, Petition 245-05, Inter-Am Comm’n H.R, Report No. 64/10,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2010) (adding Articles 1, 6, and 8 of the Inter-American Convention
to Prevent and Punish Torture); Martínez Torres v. Mexico, Petition 161-01, Inter-Am Comm’n
H.R., Report No. 72/10, OEA/Ser.L./V/II, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2010) (adding Article 24 of the Ameri-
can Convention and Articles 1, 6, and 8 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish
Torture).
90 “Five Pensioners” v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 98, ¶¶ 152–53 (Feb. 28, 2003).
91 Id. ¶ 154.
92 Id. at ¶ 21 (Cançado Trindade, J., concurring):
The criterion adopted by the Court in the present Judgment in the case of the Five
Pensioners versus Peru correctly considers that one cannot hinder the right of the
petitioners of access to justice at international level, which finds expression in their
faculty to indicate the rights which they deem violated. The respect for the exercise
of that right is required from the States Parties to the Convention, at the level of their
respective domestic legal orders, and it would not make any sense if it were denied
in the international procedure under the Convention itself. The new criterion of the
Court clearly confirms the understanding whereby the process is not and end in itself,
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mitted petitioners to raise new issues and claims,93 including for new victims.94
The Court’s posture is not defensible given the lengthy time and multiple stages
of proceedings before the IACHR where the petitioners are entitled to have le-
gal representation. The Court has never indicated why petitioners should not
be estopped from raising additional rights violations if they fail to litigate them
before the IACHR, giving both the state and the IACHR the opportunity to as-
sess the merits of the claim and to provide a full record to the Court. In many
legal systems, procedural default attaches at the end of first instance proceed-
ings and litigants are then deemed to have waived any rights they have failed to
invoke. International courts apply the doctrine of waiver to state defenses, like
exhaustion of remedies, and there appears to be no compelling reason to justify
a different rule for petitioners. The Court has indeed held that some late claims
are time-barred, but it also stated that it would consider them under jura novit
curia, a practice that at the least seems to flout the Court’s rules of procedure.95
Aside from its deficiencies in procedural regularity, the Court’s approach
makes no sense from the perspective of limited judicial resources. The current
practice means the Court often faces new allegations late in the proceedings
without a solid body of evidence or legal arguments from the parties.96 Having
issues fully litigated before the IACHR should provide the Court with a better
record. Moreover, requiring the full presentation of a case before the IACHR
but rather a means of realization of Law, and, ultimately, of justice.
Id. (footnote omitted).
93 Moiwana Cmty. v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judg-
ment Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, ¶ 91 (June 15, 2005).
94 In Mack Chang v. Guatemala, the representatives of the next of kin of the victim asked the
Court to find a violation of Article 5 of the American Convention to the detriment of the next of kin.
The Inter-American Commission did not allege such a violation. Mack Chang v. Guatemala, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 101, ¶¶ 223–25 (Nov. 21, 2003).
See also Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 149, ¶ 156 (July 4, 2006) (pointing out that the next of kin of the victims of violations
of human rights may be victims themselves and adding additional victims to the proceeding).
95 In Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, the Court added Article 19, rights of the child, on behalf
of the son and nephew of the victim based on a request by the representatives of the victims in
their brief with final arguments. The Court called this allegation time-barred, but then decided to
examine, based on the jura novit curia principle. Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, Merits, Repara-
tions, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 103, ¶ 140 (Nov. 27, 2003). The Court
took the same approach in the Girls Yean and Bosico and Ximenes-Lopes. Girls Yean and Bosico
v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 130 (Sept. 8, 2005) (called Yean and Bosico Children in some sources);
Ximenes-Lopes, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 149, ¶ 155.
96 In writing arguments in García-Asto v. Peru, the Commission pointed out that the victim’s
representatives referred for the first time in the proceedings before the Court to a new issue: the
“bodily and psychological harassment and coercion” inflicted on the petitioners. The representatives
responded that “the particulars detailed by the [alleged victims] in the brief of requests, arguments,
and evidence, refer[red] to the facts mentioned in a general way in the application filed by the Com-
mission.” García-Asto v. Peru, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 137, ¶¶ 68, 71 (Nov. 25, 2005). The Court recalled its own ability
to apply the jura novit curia principle but stressed that, with regard to rights claimed for the first
time by the representatives of the alleged victims and/or their next of kin, the legal arguments must
be based upon the facts set out in the application.
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could induce more friendly settlements and compliance, lessening the burden on
the Court. Given the length of time required for petitions to proceed through
the IACHR from initial filing to a merits determination, petitioners would be
hard-pressed to argue that they would be disadvantaged by a rule requiring that
they present all of their allegations and legal arguments first to the IACHR.
A different situation arises if the petitioners raise an issue and the IACHR
decides against admissibility or finds no violation on the merits.97 No doubt the
Court can review such decisions, but it does not need jura novit curia for this
purpose.98 The Court could apply jura novit curia correctly in the rare instance
where it determines that the petitioners, the IACHR, and the state have all missed
a relevant legal issue. This will normally arise if the case presents an issue of first
impression or the Court aims to extend its jurisprudence.99
Granting the utility, if not the necessity, of the principle, the use of jura
novit curia should be supported by a reasoned decision explaining why rights
or treaties have been added or substituted for those invoked by the petitioners.
Any perceived additional victims should be informed of the right to bring their
own petition and should not be added to the one under consideration, thereby
diluting attention to claims of the primary victim. The decision to modify cases
through jura novit curia should be taken as early as possible in the proceed-
ings, normally at the admissibility stage, giving both parties an opportunity to
present legal arguments and facts relevant to the newly-included rights. New
claims should not be asserted by any parties late in the litigation.
The due process rights of the parties require that no decision should be based
on a legal theory that the parties have not had an opportunity to argue or have
not been notified will be part of the judgment. Such a practice may be rightly per-
ceived to conflict with the parties’ right to be heard (audiatur et altera pars).100
97 In “Five Pensioners,” petitioners had raised an alleged violation of Article 25 in the original
petition, but the Commission did not determine the existence of the alleged violation. Thus, the
Commission agreed that the Court could examine the matter. “Five Pensioners,” Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 98, ¶ 102.
98 Moiwana Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, ¶ 60 (“The Commission’s assessment
with respect to alleged violations of the American Convention is not binding upon the Court.”).
99 See Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146 (Mar. 29, 2006). In Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community, the
Court made use of jura novit curia to announce a new doctrine on the right to juridical personality
(Article 3 of the Convention). This method of developing the jurisprudence is not entirely misplaced,
since litigants will often focus on litigating established standards rather than arguing for a new prin-
ciple. This approach was also followed in the case of Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148 (July 1,
2006) (expanding the interpretation of Article 11(2) on the right to a home); see also Kimel v. Ar-
gentina, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 177 (May 2,
2008).
100 Instances where common law judges have used jura novit curia in this manner have led to
reversal and criticism by appellate courts. In Hadmor Productions, the House of Lords overturned
Lord Denning’s judgment in the Court of Appeal, because he had researched and used in the case
a passage from a source which, at the time, both courts and parties were not allowed to use. Lord
Diplock described this as a breach “of one of the most fundamental rules of natural justice: the right
of each to be informed of any point adverse to him this is going to be relied upon by the judge and
to be given an opportunity of stating what his answer to it is.” Hadmor Prods. v. Hamilton, [1983]
1 AC 191 (HL) 233, rev’g [1981] 2 All ER 724.
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Moreover, broad application of jura novit curia overrides the parties’ authority,
at least in private law, to decide the subject and aims of the litigation.101 Ap-
plicants may perceive a reformulation of their claims as diminishing their right
of access to justice, placing the tribunal’s own interests or concerns above their
own. Finally, the IACHR and the Court must give attention to the legitimacy
of their process. Legitimacy may be questioned when the decision-maker intro-
duces a point of law that permits one party to succeed on the basis of a claim
that, absent the tribunal’s intervention, would not have been part of the case.
The losing side may well perceive bias in the outcome.
VIII Merits and Time Limits
A petition found admissible by the IACHR becomes a case after the admissibility
report is adopted. Although admissibility and merits can be considered together,
this is rarely done, and states in particular object to the practice of merging the
two. As with admissibility, time limits are set in the Rules for submission of
pleadings and evidence. But, as with admissibility, these limitations are rarely
complied with or enforced.
Hearings can be held on the merits of cases, but rarely are. More common are
private working meetings between the parties with the country rapporteur and
the staff attorney. In rare instances, cases may be discussed during on-site visits,
but more often these visits are occasions for the collection of new petitions.
Two of the three annual IACHR sessions include a week set aside for public
hearings, and all three sessions involve days devoted to administrative matters,
urgent issues, reports from the secretariat, and occasional meetings with the po-
litical bodies and government representatives. Normally, fewer than five days a
session are spent in discussing draft decisions on admissibility, the merits, archiv-
ing of petitions, and precautionary measures. There is little time for deliberation
or careful consideration of the cases. Most importantly, the IACHR does not
know what arguments the parties made or what evidence was submitted apart
from what is contained in the presentation by the staff attorney. Without hav-
ing the files and the pleadings, it is very difficult for the IACHR to challenge the
characterization presented, except on matters of international law when obvious
errors are spotted. Objections to the draft are sometimes rejected on the basis
that the draft reflects the views of the Court, despite the independent decision-
making function of the IACHR.
The Court has increasingly limited the time available to the IACHR to present
a case in hearings, despite the independent role the IACHR plays. While vic-
tims are concerned with redress, the IACHR’s focus is on compliance and non-
repetition. The time currently allotted to the Commission for each case is fifteen
minutes of oral argument.
101 Consequently, a court judgment should normally stay within the bounds established by the
pleadings and arguments of the parties reflected in the adage nea eat judex ultra et extra petita
partium. Damška, supra note 56, at 160 n.22; Laurent Boyer & Henri Roland, Adages du
droit français [Adages of French Law] 501 (Litec 4th ed. 1999); Gérard Cornu, Vocabu-
laire juridique [Juridical Vocabulary] 308 (4th rev. ed. 2003).
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IX Conclusions: Options for the Future
The issues of illegitimacy, inefficiency, and ineffectiveness require separate but
perhaps mutually reinforcing measures. Legitimacy requires ensuring that inde-
pendent and expert commissioners have greater involvement in cases, and that
more cases present opportunities for the parties to be heard in person. Although
such measures taken in isolation could increase the delays in processing cases,
if they are part of a reform focused on repetitious cases and those where there
is clear precedent, increasingly legitimate procedures could also alleviate ineffi-
ciencies and delays. Several alternatives are briefly mentioned here.
The most radical change that might be made would be to transfer all peti-
tion proceedings concerning state parties to the Convention to the Court. This
would leave the IACHR to oversee non-parties and to focus on what it does best:
country and thematic reports, attention to gross and systematic violations, on-
site visits, and promotional activities, including standard setting. Such a change
would add to the burden of the Court, but would shorten the time for considera-
tion of petitions and reinforce the strengths of each institution. In such a system,
the IACHR should still have the right to appear in cases before the Court to
present the country context and recommendations about reparations.
A more limited proposal would have the IACHR continue to do the initial
processing and admissibility of cases, transmitting those deemed admissible to
the Court for a decision on the merits. This would lessen the time necessary to
reach a decision on the merits, while preserving a role for the IACHR in all cases
submitted, ensuring that it maintains an overview of the situation throughout
the hemisphere. The main objection here, as it would be to the first proposal, is
that it does not solve the problem of managing the caseload. It simply transfers it
from one institution to another within the same system. Either of these proposals
would likely shorten the time for case processing, however, by avoiding two
reviews of cases on the merits, one by the IACHR and a second by the Court.
If all cases are kept within the IACHR, clearly some reform is needed to
handle them expeditiously. In this respect, the initial processing could include
a case-weighting system more enhanced than the current system of identifying
those cases that should receive expedited treatment. A more nuanced treatment
would include identifying those cases that raise similar issues involving the same
country (repetitious cases), further divided into those similar cases raising new
issues of interpretation and those for which clear precedent exists. The screened
cases could all be processed together, although not as a single case. They would
be prepared with short memoranda using identical dispositive language, no hear-
ings, and disposed of by a three or four member panel of commissioners. Based
on experience with such a system, it can be estimated that two such panels sit-
ting during a day could decide upwards of 100 cases, if sufficient petitions meet
the criteria for screening. Such a system exists in many domestic courts, and is
an efficient and expeditious way to handle repetitive cases raising no new issues.
On a scale of one to ten, these cases are usually rated between one and three, on
which basis they are deemed screening cases and are handled in this manner.
Repetitious cases from the same country, but raising a new legal issue or is-
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sues, could be handled through a “pilot” judgment procedure akin to that of the
European Court of Human Rights, or by joining them into a single case. The
existence of new issues suggests that a hearing would be appropriate, perhaps
on-site if there are facts at issue. All cases should focus on the key issues, leav-
ing aside peripheral matters not germane to the most significant violations. The
European Court has in fact rejected making findings on such marginal matters
in its judgments; and they correct in doing so.
More complex matters, as well as new matters, should be processed and
decided by the plenary IACHR, for which each member should receive the pe-
tition and the pleadings of the parties. To carry this out, it would be useful to
have a full-time IACHR, but the political will and consensus among members
of the OAS is absent in this respect. The large majority of states are unwilling
to reopen the Convention. Representatives of other stakeholders express con-
cern that it would be difficult to attract good candidates to a four-year full-time
position. The recent experience of some states in the European system, where it
has proved difficult to attract well-qualified candidates to serve as judges on the
European Court, gives some support to this concern. On the other hand, it has
not always been possible to identify good candidates for the part-time IACHR.
At the least, for legitimacy and efficiency purposes, the President of the IACHR
should become a full-time position, with the Executive Secretary becoming more
of an administrator of the secretariat. This change should be accompanied by a
more rigorous selection process for the presidency and revised rules of procedure
to provide in more detail the scope of the President’s functions, as well as those
of the secretariat.
Internally, the secretariat could and should be reorganized in large part along
thematic lines rather than in geographic units. The workload could be divided
into high and low volume subjects, and the thematic and country rapporteurs
on the IACHR would work with the appropriate unit. Another alternative, with
or without some of the above, would be to divide the staff attorneys among the
commissioners as law clerks working directly with the individual commissioner.
All petitions, once registered, and all pleadings, should be sent to the relevant
rapporteurs, if not to the full IACHR. This will require a much greater budget
for translation and electronic databases of all the materials. It also means that
more time is necessary for the IACHR with an increased honorarium.
Reforms are clearly needed. The present system for handling petitions does
not serve the IACHR or the parties well. Too much time is consumed before
decisions on admissibility and the merits are made. This prejudices the outcome
of cases, particularly where facts are at issue and the passage of time leaves the
IACHR with little more than “dueling narratives” about what happened years
previously. Victims of sexual violence, extrajudicial killings, and other attacks
on personal security may be particularly disadvantaged due to the absence of
forensic evidence and adequate domestic investigations. In such instances, the
IACHR should give greater attention to determining when to shift the burden of
proof, what standard of proof is adequate, and how much weight to give to the
credibility of the witnesses and the state authorities. More time for hearings in
cases, assuming the IACHR retains jurisdiction over all of them, could assist in
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fact-finding if the hearings are properly prepared and conducted.
Compliance is linked to legitimacy and credibility. At present, the IACHR
system of processing cases needs to reinforce its legitimacy and credibility, both
linked to efficiency but also posing broader issues. It is also important to empha-
size that the IACHR does many things right and it is often the proper exercise
of its functions that generates the greatest criticism. States do not like to be crit-
icized and do not like to lose cases. When proposals for reform are made, they
should always be with the aim of strengthening of the system, and not with its
demise or weakening.
